

STATE OF WISCONSIN Division of Hearings and Appeals

In the Matter of	
Office of the Inspector General, Petitioner	
vs. Respondent	DECISION Case #: FOF - 170082
Pursuant to petition filed November 3, 2015, under 7 C.F.R. §273.16, to review a decision by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to disqualify from receiving FoodShare benefits (FS) for a period of ten years, a hearing was held on December 22, 2015, by telephone.	
The issue for determination is whether the respondent committed an Intentional Program Violation (IPV).	
PARTIES IN INTEREST: Petitioner:	
Office of the Inspector General Northeastern Regional Office 200 N. Jefferson St., Suite 511 Green Bay, WI 54301 By:	
Respondent: (Did not appear)	
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Brian C. Schneider Division of Hearings and Appeals	
FINDINGS OF FACT	

- 1. The respondent (CARES # County in 2014 and 2015.
- 2. The respondent applied for FS in Wisconsin on September 4, 2014 reporting that she was homeless in Milwaukee. She reported that no member of her household was receiving FS elsewhere.

- 3. The respondent was receiving FS in Indiana on the date she applied in Wisconsin and thereafter received FS in both states. She used her FS cards interchangeably, most of the time in Indiana. She received \$3,581 in FS in Wisconsin from September, 2014 through January 31, 2015, after which the Wisconsin case closed following the discovery of the duplicate benefits.
- 4. On November 16, 2015, the petitioner prepared an Administrative Disqualification Hearing Notice alleging that the respondent falsely reported her residence to receive duplicate FS.
- 5. The respondent failed to appear for the scheduled December 22, 2015 IPV hearing and did not provide any good cause for said failure to appear.

DISCUSSION

An intentional program violation of the FoodShare program occurs when a recipient intentionally does the following:

- 1. makes a false or misleading statement, or misrepresents, conceals or withholds facts; or
- 2. commits any act that constitutes a violation of the Food Stamp Act, the Food Stamp Program Regulations, or any Wisconsin statute for the purpose of using, presenting, transferring, acquiring, receiving, possessing or trafficking of FoodShare benefits or QUEST cards.

FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook, §3.14.1; see also 7 C.F.R. §273.16(c) and Wis. Stat., §§946.92(2).

An intentional program violation can be proven by a court order, a diversion agreement entered into with the local district attorney, a waiver of a right to a hearing, or an administrative disqualification hearing. *FoodShare Wisconsin Handbook*, §3.14.1. The petitioner can disqualify only the individual found to have committed the intentional violation; it cannot disqualify the entire household. Although other family members cannot be disqualified, their monthly allotments will be reduced unless they agree to make restitution within 30 days of the date that the FS program mails a written demand letter. 7 C.F.R. §273.16(b).

There is a specific provision that applies to this case. 7 C.F.R. §273.16(b)(5) provides: "... an individual found to have made a fraudulent statement or representation with respect to the identity or place of residence of the individual in order to receive multiple food stamp benefits simultaneously shall be ineligible to participate in the Program for a period of 10 years."

7 C.F.R. §273.16(e)(4) provides that the hearing shall proceed if the respondent cannot be located or fails to appear without good cause. The respondent did not appear or claim a good cause reason for not attending the hearing. Therefore I must determine whether the respondent committed an IPV based solely on the evidence that the petitioner presented at hearing.

In order for the petitioner to establish that an FS recipient has committed an IPV, it has the burden to prove two separate elements by clear and convincing evidence. The recipient must have: 1) committed; and 2) intended to commit a program violation per 7 C.F.R. § 273.16(e)(6). In *Kuehn v. Kuehn*, 11 Wis.2d 15 (1959), the court held that:

Defined in terms of quantity of proof, reasonable certitude or reasonable certainty in ordinary civil cases may be attained by or be based on a mere or fair preponderance of the evidence. Such certainty need not necessarily exclude the probability that the contrary conclusion may be true. In fraud cases it has been stated the preponderance of the evidence should be clear and satisfactory to indicate or sustain a greater degree of certitude. Such degree of certitude has also been defined as being produced by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence. Such evidence, however, need not eliminate a reasonable doubt that the alternative or opposite conclusion may be true....

Kuehn, 11 Wis.2d at 26.

Wisconsin Jury Instruction – Civil 205 is also instructive. It provides:

Clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence is evidence which when weighed against that opposed to it clearly has more convincing power. It is evidence which satisfies and convinces you that "yes" should be the answer because of its greater weight and clear convincing power. "Reasonable certainty" means that you are persuaded based upon a rational consideration of the evidence. Absolute certainty is not required, but a guess is not enough to meet the burden of proof. This burden of proof is known as the "middle burden." The evidence required to meet this burden of proof must be more convincing than merely the greater weight of the credible evidence but may be less than beyond a reasonable doubt.

Further, the *McCormick* treatise states that "it has been persuasively suggested that [the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof] could be more simply and intelligibly translated to the jury if they were instructed that they must be persuaded that the truth of the contention is highly probable." 2 *McCormick on Evidence* §340 (John W. Strong gen. ed., 4th ed. 1992).

In order to find that an IPV was committed, the trier of fact must derive from the evidence a firm conviction as to the existence of each of the two elements even though there may be a reasonable doubt as to their existence.

In order to prove the second element, i.e., intention, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient intended to commit the IPV. The question of intent is generally one to be determined by the trier of fact. *State v. Lossman*, 118 Wis.2d 526 (1984). There is a general rule that a person is presumed to know and intend the probable and natural consequences of his or her own voluntary words or acts. See *John F. Jelke Co. v. Beck*, 208 Wis. 650 (1932); 31A C.J.S. Evidence §131. Intention is a subjective state of mind to be determined upon all the facts. *Lecus v. American Mut. Ins. Co. of Boston*, 81 Wis.2d 183 (1977). Thus there must be clear and convincing evidence that the FS recipient knew that the act or omission was a violation of the FS Program but committed the violation anyway.

Based upon the record before me, I find that the petitioner has established by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent intentionally violated FS program rules by reporting a false residence in Wisconsin in order to receive FS in both Indiana and Wisconsin. There simply is no innocent explanation whatsoever why the respondent would apply for FS in Wisconsin as homeless when she kept her Indiana residence and presumably kept her children in school in Indiana. Her use of both states' benefits over a period of several months lends credence to the conclusion that she deliberately misrepresented the Wisconsin residence to receive duplicate FS. Therefore the petitioner correctly seeks to disqualify the respondent from the FS program for ten years.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The respondent violated, and intended to violate, the FS program rule specifying that a recipient shall not report a fraudulent address in order to receive duplicate FS from two states.

NOW, THEREFORE, it is ORDERED

That the petitioner's determination is sustained, and that the petitioner may make a finding that the respondent committed a FoodShare program IPV and disqualify the respondent from the program for ten years, effective the first month following the date of receipt of this decision.

REOUEST FOR A REHEARING ON GROUNDS OF GOOD CAUSE FOR FAILURE TO APPEAR

In instances where the good cause for failure to appear is based upon a showing of non-receipt of the hearing notice, the respondent has 30 days after the date of the written notice of the hearing decision to claim good cause for failure to appear. See 7 C.F.R. sec. 273.16(e)(4). Such a claim should be made in writing to the Division of Hearings and Appeals, P.O. Box 7875, Madison, WI 53707-7875.

APPEAL TO COURT

You may also appeal this decision to the Milwaukee County Circuit Court. Appeals must be filed with the Court and served either personally or by certified mail on the Secretary of the Department of Health Services, 1 West Wilson Street, Room 651, Madison, WI 53703, and on those identified in this decision as "PARTIES IN INTEREST" no more than 30 days after the date of this decision or 30 days after a denial of a timely rehearing request (if you request one).

The process for Circuit Court Appeals may be found at Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52 and 227.53. A copy of the statutes may be found online or at your local library or courthouse.

Given under my hand at the City of Madison, Wisconsin, this 5th day of January, 2016

\sBrian C. Schneider Administrative Law Judge Division of Hearings and Appeals

c: Miles - email
Public Assistance Collection Unit - email
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability - email
- email



State of Wisconsin\DIVISION OF HEARINGS AND APPEALS

Brian Hayes, Administrator Suite 201 5005 University Avenue Madison, WI 53705-5400 Telephone: (608) 266-3096 FAX: (608) 264-9885 email: DHAmail@wisconsin.gov Internet: http://dha.state.wi.us

The preceding decision was sent to the following parties on January 5, 2016.

Milwaukee Enrollment Services
Public Assistance Collection Unit
Division of Health Care Access and Accountability

@wisconsin.gov